FIND IT BEFORE THEY DO. · RUST GATE #![forbid(unsafe_code)] · ZERO-JS
ZERO 1.0 · MISTRAL SMALL 4 (119B MoE) · GATED WEIGHTS & PRIVATE API
CORTEXROUTER LAB · FIND IT BEFORE THEY DO.

CortexRouter Zero 1.0 — 119B MoE 零日漏洞发现与深度审计引擎

基于 Mistral Small 4(1190 亿总参数、128 专家混合 MoE 架构、每词元约 6.5B 激活参数、256K 上下文窗口)训练,精准识别传统静态分析(SAST)遗漏的跨文件认证绕过、密码学缺陷与内存安全漏洞。

🔒 模型权重暂未公开 — 联系申请 API 访问:遵循负责任的安全准则,CortexRouter Zero 1.0(119B)模型权重不对外公开发布。经核验的安全团队、软件厂商(PSIRT)、CERT/CSIRT 机构及企业安全合作伙伴可通过邮件或 OpenPGP 联系我们申请私有 API 访问权限。
119B MoE
Mistral Small 4 · 128 专家 (~6.5B 激活)
256K Tokens
完整仓库级跨文件上下文
12 HTR
真实披露中的 HTR-2026 零日发现
Gated API
权重未公开 · 零数据留存

交互式深度代码审计与推理浏览器(脱敏示例)

纯静态零 JavaScript(0 KB JS):按漏洞类别筛选并点击任意案例,查看 Zero 1.0(119B MoE)如何定位复杂逻辑缺陷。

#01 CWE-287 · Go · JWT Key Loader JWS Header `kid` Path Traversal Loads Predictable Empty Key (`/dev/null`) AUTH / RBAC
1. 多分支目标源码片段(脱敏教学示例)
// synthetic/jwtauth/verifier.go
func VerifySessionJWT(rawToken string, keyDir string) (*Claims, error) {
    hdr, payload, sig, err := splitJWS(rawToken)
    if err != nil || hdr.Alg != "HS256" {
        return nil, ErrInvalidHeader
    }
    // Attacker sets kid="../../../dev/null" -> keyBytes is []byte{} (0 bytes)!
    keyBytes, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(keyDir, hdr.KeyID + ".key"))
    if err != nil { return nil, err }
    if !hmac.Equal(sig, computeHMAC256(keyBytes, payload)) {
        return nil, ErrBadSignature
    }
    return parseClaims(payload)
}
2. CortexRouter Zero 1.0(119B MoE)结构化推理输出
01 · 激活专家路由
Auth-Token Expert + Filesystem-Sink Analyzer
02 · MITRE CWE 分类
CWE-287 (AUTH / RBAC)
06 · 模型判定
✓ CONFIRMED_LOGIC_FLAW
03 · 传统 SAST 漏报原因
`Alg == "HS256"` and `hmac.Equal` pass standard JWT linter checks; `.key` suffix hides traversal unless path normalization is traced.
04 · 根本原因链路
`filepath.Join(keyDir, hdr.KeyID)` resolves `../` segments outside `keyDir`, allowing an attacker to sign arbitrary admin tokens with a known empty or public file.
05 · 最小安全修复建议
Validate `hdr.KeyID` against strict alphanumeric allowlist (`^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]{1,32}$`) or look up keys in an in-memory map.
3. 企业私有 API 调用示例(需授权密钥)
curl -s https://api.cortexrouter.ai/v1/audit/completions \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $CORTEXROUTER_API_KEY" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"model":"cortexrouter-zero-1.0-119b","reasoning_effort":"high","case_ref":"ZR-DEMO-01","cwe_focus":"CWE-287"}'
#02 CWE-190 · C / Rust FFI · Raster 32-Bit Dimension Overflow (`width * height * 4`) Under-Allocates Pixel Buffer MEMORY / DOS
1. 多分支目标源码片段(脱敏教学示例)
// synthetic/imgcodec/raster_ffi.c
int decode_rgba_tile(uint32_t width, uint32_t height, const uint8_t *src, size_t src_len) {
    if (width > 65535 || height > 65535) return -1;
    // 65535 * 65535 * 4 overflows 32-bit uint32_t before widening to size_t!
    uint32_t buf_bytes = width * height * 4;
    uint8_t *rgba = (uint8_t *)malloc(buf_bytes);
    if (!rgba) return -1;
    return unpack_rows(rgba, width, height, src, src_len); // Out-of-bounds heap write
}
2. CortexRouter Zero 1.0(119B MoE)结构化推理输出
01 · 激活专家路由
Memory-Safety Expert + Integer-Range Solver
02 · MITRE CWE 分类
CWE-190 (MEMORY / DOS)
06 · 模型判定
✓ CONFIRMED_LOGIC_FLAW
03 · 传统 SAST 漏报原因
Explicit upper-bound checks (`width <= 65535`, `height <= 65535`) fool pattern scanners into marking both operands bounded.
04 · 根本原因链路
`width * height * 4` wraps modulo `2^32` inside `uint32_t`, allocating a tiny heap buffer followed by multi-megabyte row writes.
05 · 最小安全修复建议
Perform checked `size_t` arithmetic (`__builtin_mul_overflow`) before allocation.
3. 企业私有 API 调用示例(需授权密钥)
curl -s https://api.cortexrouter.ai/v1/audit/completions \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $CORTEXROUTER_API_KEY" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"model":"cortexrouter-zero-1.0-119b","reasoning_effort":"high","case_ref":"ZR-DEMO-02","cwe_focus":"CWE-190"}'
#03 CWE-347 · Python · XML/SAML Auth Signature Verified on First `<Assertion>` While Session Reads Unverified Sibling CRYPTO / SIG
1. 多分支目标源码片段(脱敏教学示例)
# synthetic/sso/saml_consumer.py
def consume_saml_response(xml_doc: Element) -> str:
    sig_node = xml_doc.find(".//ds:Signature", NS)
    signed_assertion = sig_node.getparent()
    verify_xmldsig(signed_assertion, IDP_CERT)  # Verifies signed_assertion only!

    # BUG: Queries the document root instead of the verified signed_assertion!
    primary_subject = xml_doc.find(".//saml:Assertion/saml:Subject/saml:NameID", NS)
    return primary_subject.text
2. CortexRouter Zero 1.0(119B MoE)结构化推理输出
01 · 激活专家路由
Crypto-Protocol Expert + DOM-Tree Provenance Tracker
02 · MITRE CWE 分类
CWE-347 (CRYPTO / SIG)
06 · 模型判定
✓ CONFIRMED_LOGIC_FLAW
03 · 传统 SAST 漏报原因
`verify_xmldsig` cryptographic call is valid and executed unconditionally before reading `NameID`.
04 · 根本原因链路
Attacker prepends an unsigned `<saml:Assertion>` before the legitimately signed assertion; `xml_doc.find` returns the attacker's `NameID`.
05 · 最小安全修复建议
Extract `Subject/NameID` strictly from the exact `signed_assertion` subtree returned by `verify_xmldsig`.
3. 企业私有 API 调用示例(需授权密钥)
curl -s https://api.cortexrouter.ai/v1/audit/completions \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $CORTEXROUTER_API_KEY" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"model":"cortexrouter-zero-1.0-119b","reasoning_effort":"high","case_ref":"ZR-DEMO-03","cwe_focus":"CWE-347"}'
#04 CWE-639 · TypeScript · GraphQL Shared Request-Batch DataLoader Leaks Cross-Tenant Invoice Objects AUTH / RBAC
1. 多分支目标源码片段(脱敏教学示例)
// synthetic/graphql/loaders.ts (singleton cache across HTTP requests!)
const invoiceLoader = new DataLoader<string, Invoice>(async (ids) => {
  const rows = await db.query("SELECT * FROM invoices WHERE id = ANY($1)", [ids]);
  return ids.map((id) => rows.find((r) => r.id === id));
});

export async function resolveInvoice(_: unknown, args: { id: string }, ctx: AuthCtx) {
  if (!ctx.orgId) throw new UnauthorizedError();
  return invoiceLoader.load(args.id); // Missing ctx.orgId ownership verification!
}
2. CortexRouter Zero 1.0(119B MoE)结构化推理输出
01 · 激活专家路由
Multi-Tenant Isolation Expert + Async-Lifecycle Analyzer
02 · MITRE CWE 分类
CWE-639 (AUTH / RBAC)
06 · 模型判定
✓ CONFIRMED_LOGIC_FLAW
03 · 传统 SAST 漏报原因
`ctx.orgId` guard is present in resolver and SQL query uses parameterized `$1` binding.
04 · 根本原因链路
Module-scoped `DataLoader` caches records across all tenants and never checks `invoice.orgId === ctx.orgId`.
05 · 最小安全修复建议
Instantiate `DataLoader` per request context and filter `WHERE id = ANY($1) AND org_id = $2`.
3. 企业私有 API 调用示例(需授权密钥)
curl -s https://api.cortexrouter.ai/v1/audit/completions \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $CORTEXROUTER_API_KEY" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"model":"cortexrouter-zero-1.0-119b","reasoning_effort":"high","case_ref":"ZR-DEMO-04","cwe_focus":"CWE-639"}'
#05 CWE-362 · Go · Ledger Service Read-Then-Write Balance Check Outside Serializable Transaction Enables Double-Spend CRYPTO / SIG
1. 多分支目标源码片段(脱敏教学示例)
// synthetic/ledger/withdraw.go
func Withdraw(ctx context.Context, db *sql.DB, acctID string, amount int64) error {
    var bal int64
    _ = db.QueryRowContext(ctx, "SELECT balance FROM accounts WHERE id=$1", acctID).Scan(&bal)
    if bal < amount {
        return ErrInsufficientFunds
    }
    _, err := db.ExecContext(ctx, "UPDATE accounts SET balance = balance - $1 WHERE id=$2", amount, acctID)
    return err
}
2. CortexRouter Zero 1.0(119B MoE)结构化推理输出
01 · 激活专家路由
Concurrency & DB-Isolation Expert + State-Invariant Checker
02 · MITRE CWE 分类
CWE-362 (CRYPTO / SIG)
06 · 模型判定
✓ CONFIRMED_LOGIC_FLAW
03 · 传统 SAST 漏报原因
Sequential logic appears sound in single-threaded control-flow analysis.
04 · 根本原因链路
Concurrent requests pass `bal < amount` simultaneously before `UPDATE` commits, driving account balance negative.
05 · 最小安全修复建议
Use a single atomic statement: `UPDATE accounts SET balance = balance - $1 WHERE id = $2 AND balance >= $1`.
3. 企业私有 API 调用示例(需授权密钥)
curl -s https://api.cortexrouter.ai/v1/audit/completions \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $CORTEXROUTER_API_KEY" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"model":"cortexrouter-zero-1.0-119b","reasoning_effort":"high","case_ref":"ZR-DEMO-05","cwe_focus":"CWE-362"}'
#06 CWE-918 · TypeScript · Preview Fetch Pre-Fetch IP Blocklist Bypassed via HTTP 302 Redirect to Cloud Metadata WEB / XSS-CSRF
1. 多分支目标源码片段(脱敏教学示例)
// synthetic/preview/fetcher.ts
export async function fetchRemoteAvatar(rawUrl: string): Promise<ArrayBuffer> {
  const parsed = new URL(rawUrl);
  const resolvedIp = await dnsLookup(parsed.hostname);
  if (isPrivateOrLinkLocalIp(resolvedIp)) {
    throw new Error("Blocked internal address");
  }
  // Default redirect: "follow" silently follows 302 -> http://169.254.169.254/!
  const resp = await fetch(parsed.toString(), { signal: AbortSignal.timeout(3000) });
  return resp.arrayBuffer();
}
2. CortexRouter Zero 1.0(119B MoE)结构化推理输出
01 · 激活专家路由
Network-Boundary Expert + HTTP-Client Semantics Analyzer
02 · MITRE CWE 分类
CWE-918 (WEB / XSS-CSRF)
06 · 模型判定
✓ CONFIRMED_LOGIC_FLAW
03 · 传统 SAST 漏报原因
`isPrivateOrLinkLocalIp` check is present right before `fetch`, fooling SSRF taint rules.
04 · 根本原因链路
Initial URL resolves to an external attacker IP that responds `302 Found` to `http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/`, which `fetch` follows without re-checking.
05 · 最小安全修复建议
Set `redirect: 'error'` (or validate every hop via a custom socket dialer pinning the verified IP).
3. 企业私有 API 调用示例(需授权密钥)
curl -s https://api.cortexrouter.ai/v1/audit/completions \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $CORTEXROUTER_API_KEY" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"model":"cortexrouter-zero-1.0-119b","reasoning_effort":"high","case_ref":"ZR-DEMO-06","cwe_focus":"CWE-918"}'
#07 CWE-22 · Rust · Tar Extractor Two-Entry Symlink + File Tarball Escapes Destination Directory (Symlink Zip-Slip) MEMORY / DOS
1. 多分支目标源码片段(脱敏教学示例)
// synthetic/archiver/unpack.rs
pub fn unpack_bundle(archive: &mut Archive<File>, dest: &Path) -> io::Result<()> {
    for entry in archive.entries()? {
        let mut entry = entry?;
        let rel = entry.path()?;
        if rel.components().any(|c| matches!(c, Component::ParentDir)) {
            return Err(io::Error::new(io::ErrorKind::InvalidInput, "parent traversal"));
        }
        // Entry 1 creates symlink 'dest/sub -> /etc'; Entry 2 writes 'dest/sub/cron.d/job'!
        entry.unpack(dest.join(&rel))?;
    }
    Ok(())
}
2. CortexRouter Zero 1.0(119B MoE)结构化推理输出
01 · 激活专家路由
Filesystem-State Expert + Multi-Step Archive Simulator
02 · MITRE CWE 分类
CWE-22 (MEMORY / DOS)
06 · 模型判定
✓ CONFIRMED_LOGIC_FLAW
03 · 传统 SAST 漏报原因
`Component::ParentDir` (`..`) check blocks lexical path traversal on individual entry names.
04 · 根本原因链路
Lexical path check ignores previously extracted symlink entries (`sub -> /etc`), allowing subsequent clean relative paths to write outside `dest`.
05 · 最小安全修复建议
Reject symlink/hardlink archive entries (`EntryType::Symlink`) and use `openat2(..., RESOLVE_BENEATH)`.
3. 企业私有 API 调用示例(需授权密钥)
curl -s https://api.cortexrouter.ai/v1/audit/completions \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $CORTEXROUTER_API_KEY" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"model":"cortexrouter-zero-1.0-119b","reasoning_effort":"high","case_ref":"ZR-DEMO-07","cwe_focus":"CWE-22"}'
#08 CWE-444 · C · Reverse Proxy Parser Tab-Separated `Transfer-Encoding:\tchunked` Triggers CL.TE Request Smuggling WEB / XSS-CSRF
1. 多分支目标源码片段(脱敏教学示例)
// synthetic/edgeproxy/http_hdr.c
int has_chunked_encoding(const char *hdr_line) {
    // Only checks exact ASCII space after colon; misses horizontal tab '\t' or OWS!
    return strncasecmp(hdr_line, "Transfer-Encoding: chunked", 26) == 0;
}
2. CortexRouter Zero 1.0(119B MoE)结构化推理输出
01 · 激活专家路由
RFC-9112 Grammar Expert + Differential Parser Fuzzer
02 · MITRE CWE 分类
CWE-444 (WEB / XSS-CSRF)
06 · 模型判定
✓ CONFIRMED_LOGIC_FLAW
03 · 传统 SAST 漏报原因
Code explicitly inspects `Transfer-Encoding` header, appearing to handle chunked framing.
04 · 根本原因链路
Edge proxy ignores `Transfer-Encoding:\tchunked` and forwards using `Content-Length`, while RFC-compliant backend parses chunked body—desynchronizing the socket.
05 · 最小安全修复建议
Parse optional whitespace (OWS: SP / HTAB) per RFC 9112 and reject requests containing both `Transfer-Encoding` and `Content-Length`.
3. 企业私有 API 调用示例(需授权密钥)
curl -s https://api.cortexrouter.ai/v1/audit/completions \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $CORTEXROUTER_API_KEY" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"model":"cortexrouter-zero-1.0-119b","reasoning_effort":"high","case_ref":"ZR-DEMO-08","cwe_focus":"CWE-444"}'

模型矩阵对比 — Zero 1.0 (119B) 与 Judge v1 (8B)

维度 CortexRouter Zero 1.0(旗舰发现模型) CortexRouter Judge v1(开源验证模型)
基础架构 Mistral Small 4 · 119B 混合 MoE(128 专家,~6.5B 激活) Qwen3-8B + PEFT LoRA 适配器
上下文窗口 256,000 Tokens(完整代码库、AST 与跨文件污点流) 32,768 Tokens(HTTP 响应、错误栈与实验室证据)
核心职责 深度源码审计、复杂逻辑零日挖掘与修复补丁生成 实验证据核验与扫描器误报过滤(80/80 = 100% Holdout)
发布与授权 权重未公开(Gated)· 联系我们申请私有 API 访问 Apache-2.0 开源权重(Hugging Face 与 GitHub 公开)

私有 API 访问申请流程(模型权重不对外公开)

私有 API 请求与结构化响应示例

CortexRouter Zero 1.0 接口仅对授权团队开放,返回确定性结构化审计报告:

POST /v1/audit/completions (Request)

{
  "model": "cortexrouter-zero-1.0-119b",
  "reasoning_effort": "high",
  "zero_data_retention": true,
  "repository_context": {
    "language": "go",
    "files": ["auth/grant_router.go", "auth/ticket.go"]
  }
}

Structured Audit Diagnostics (Response)

{
  "verdict": "VULNERABLE",
  "cwe": "CWE-287",
  "confidence": 0.98,
  "routed_experts": ["auth-state", "cross-branch-taint"],
  "call_chain": ["IssueToken -> mintTicketToken"],
  "minimal_patch_ready": true
}