FIND IT BEFORE THEY DO. · RUST GATE #![forbid(unsafe_code)] · ZERO-JS
ZERO 1.0 · MISTRAL SMALL 4 (119B MoE) · GATED WEIGHTS & PRIVATE API
CORTEXROUTER LAB · FIND IT BEFORE THEY DO.

CortexRouter Zero 1.0 — Motor 119B MoE de Descoberta Zero-Day

Treinado sobre o Mistral Small 4 (119B parâmetros totais, 128 especialistas MoE híbridos, ~6,5B ativos por token e janela de 256K), nosso modelo principal identifica falhas complexas de autenticação, criptografia e memória em repositórios inteiros.

🔒 Pesos não publicados — Acesso à API mediante solicitação: Para evitar uso indevido, os pesos do CortexRouter Zero 1.0 (119B) não são divulgados publicamente. Equipes de segurança verificadas, fabricantes (PSIRT), CERT/CSIRT e organizações podem entrar em contato para solicitar acesso privado à API.
119B MoE
Mistral Small 4 · 128 Especialistas
256K Tokens
Contexto completo de 256K tokens
12 HTR
Descobertas zero-day HTR-2026 reais
Gated API
Pesos fechados · Retenção zero

Explorador interativo de auditoria profunda de código

100 % sem JavaScript (0 KB JS): filtre por classe CWE e clique em qualquer caso para inspecionar o raciocínio do Zero 1.0.

#01 CWE-287 · Go · JWT Key Loader JWS Header `kid` Path Traversal Loads Predictable Empty Key (`/dev/null`) AUTH / RBAC
1. Trecho de código analisado (Exemplo sintético)
// synthetic/jwtauth/verifier.go
func VerifySessionJWT(rawToken string, keyDir string) (*Claims, error) {
    hdr, payload, sig, err := splitJWS(rawToken)
    if err != nil || hdr.Alg != "HS256" {
        return nil, ErrInvalidHeader
    }
    // Attacker sets kid="../../../dev/null" -> keyBytes is []byte{} (0 bytes)!
    keyBytes, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(keyDir, hdr.KeyID + ".key"))
    if err != nil { return nil, err }
    if !hmac.Equal(sig, computeHMAC256(keyBytes, payload)) {
        return nil, ErrBadSignature
    }
    return parseClaims(payload)
}
2. Raciocínio estruturado do CortexRouter Zero 1.0 (119B MoE)
01 · ESPECIALISTAS ATIVOS
Auth-Token Expert + Filesystem-Sink Analyzer
02 · CLASSE MITRE CWE
CWE-287 (AUTH / RBAC)
06 · VEREDITO
✓ CONFIRMED_LOGIC_FLAW
03 · POR QUE O SAST FALHA
`Alg == "HS256"` and `hmac.Equal` pass standard JWT linter checks; `.key` suffix hides traversal unless path normalization is traced.
04 · CAUSA RAIZ
`filepath.Join(keyDir, hdr.KeyID)` resolves `../` segments outside `keyDir`, allowing an attacker to sign arbitrary admin tokens with a known empty or public file.
05 · CORREÇÃO MÍNIMA
Validate `hdr.KeyID` against strict alphanumeric allowlist (`^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]{1,32}$`) or look up keys in an in-memory map.
3. Exemplo de chamada à API privada
curl -s https://api.cortexrouter.ai/v1/audit/completions \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $CORTEXROUTER_API_KEY" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"model":"cortexrouter-zero-1.0-119b","reasoning_effort":"high","case_ref":"ZR-DEMO-01","cwe_focus":"CWE-287"}'
#02 CWE-190 · C / Rust FFI · Raster 32-Bit Dimension Overflow (`width * height * 4`) Under-Allocates Pixel Buffer MEMORY / DOS
1. Trecho de código analisado (Exemplo sintético)
// synthetic/imgcodec/raster_ffi.c
int decode_rgba_tile(uint32_t width, uint32_t height, const uint8_t *src, size_t src_len) {
    if (width > 65535 || height > 65535) return -1;
    // 65535 * 65535 * 4 overflows 32-bit uint32_t before widening to size_t!
    uint32_t buf_bytes = width * height * 4;
    uint8_t *rgba = (uint8_t *)malloc(buf_bytes);
    if (!rgba) return -1;
    return unpack_rows(rgba, width, height, src, src_len); // Out-of-bounds heap write
}
2. Raciocínio estruturado do CortexRouter Zero 1.0 (119B MoE)
01 · ESPECIALISTAS ATIVOS
Memory-Safety Expert + Integer-Range Solver
02 · CLASSE MITRE CWE
CWE-190 (MEMORY / DOS)
06 · VEREDITO
✓ CONFIRMED_LOGIC_FLAW
03 · POR QUE O SAST FALHA
Explicit upper-bound checks (`width <= 65535`, `height <= 65535`) fool pattern scanners into marking both operands bounded.
04 · CAUSA RAIZ
`width * height * 4` wraps modulo `2^32` inside `uint32_t`, allocating a tiny heap buffer followed by multi-megabyte row writes.
05 · CORREÇÃO MÍNIMA
Perform checked `size_t` arithmetic (`__builtin_mul_overflow`) before allocation.
3. Exemplo de chamada à API privada
curl -s https://api.cortexrouter.ai/v1/audit/completions \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $CORTEXROUTER_API_KEY" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"model":"cortexrouter-zero-1.0-119b","reasoning_effort":"high","case_ref":"ZR-DEMO-02","cwe_focus":"CWE-190"}'
#03 CWE-347 · Python · XML/SAML Auth Signature Verified on First `<Assertion>` While Session Reads Unverified Sibling CRYPTO / SIG
1. Trecho de código analisado (Exemplo sintético)
# synthetic/sso/saml_consumer.py
def consume_saml_response(xml_doc: Element) -> str:
    sig_node = xml_doc.find(".//ds:Signature", NS)
    signed_assertion = sig_node.getparent()
    verify_xmldsig(signed_assertion, IDP_CERT)  # Verifies signed_assertion only!

    # BUG: Queries the document root instead of the verified signed_assertion!
    primary_subject = xml_doc.find(".//saml:Assertion/saml:Subject/saml:NameID", NS)
    return primary_subject.text
2. Raciocínio estruturado do CortexRouter Zero 1.0 (119B MoE)
01 · ESPECIALISTAS ATIVOS
Crypto-Protocol Expert + DOM-Tree Provenance Tracker
02 · CLASSE MITRE CWE
CWE-347 (CRYPTO / SIG)
06 · VEREDITO
✓ CONFIRMED_LOGIC_FLAW
03 · POR QUE O SAST FALHA
`verify_xmldsig` cryptographic call is valid and executed unconditionally before reading `NameID`.
04 · CAUSA RAIZ
Attacker prepends an unsigned `<saml:Assertion>` before the legitimately signed assertion; `xml_doc.find` returns the attacker's `NameID`.
05 · CORREÇÃO MÍNIMA
Extract `Subject/NameID` strictly from the exact `signed_assertion` subtree returned by `verify_xmldsig`.
3. Exemplo de chamada à API privada
curl -s https://api.cortexrouter.ai/v1/audit/completions \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $CORTEXROUTER_API_KEY" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"model":"cortexrouter-zero-1.0-119b","reasoning_effort":"high","case_ref":"ZR-DEMO-03","cwe_focus":"CWE-347"}'
#04 CWE-639 · TypeScript · GraphQL Shared Request-Batch DataLoader Leaks Cross-Tenant Invoice Objects AUTH / RBAC
1. Trecho de código analisado (Exemplo sintético)
// synthetic/graphql/loaders.ts (singleton cache across HTTP requests!)
const invoiceLoader = new DataLoader<string, Invoice>(async (ids) => {
  const rows = await db.query("SELECT * FROM invoices WHERE id = ANY($1)", [ids]);
  return ids.map((id) => rows.find((r) => r.id === id));
});

export async function resolveInvoice(_: unknown, args: { id: string }, ctx: AuthCtx) {
  if (!ctx.orgId) throw new UnauthorizedError();
  return invoiceLoader.load(args.id); // Missing ctx.orgId ownership verification!
}
2. Raciocínio estruturado do CortexRouter Zero 1.0 (119B MoE)
01 · ESPECIALISTAS ATIVOS
Multi-Tenant Isolation Expert + Async-Lifecycle Analyzer
02 · CLASSE MITRE CWE
CWE-639 (AUTH / RBAC)
06 · VEREDITO
✓ CONFIRMED_LOGIC_FLAW
03 · POR QUE O SAST FALHA
`ctx.orgId` guard is present in resolver and SQL query uses parameterized `$1` binding.
04 · CAUSA RAIZ
Module-scoped `DataLoader` caches records across all tenants and never checks `invoice.orgId === ctx.orgId`.
05 · CORREÇÃO MÍNIMA
Instantiate `DataLoader` per request context and filter `WHERE id = ANY($1) AND org_id = $2`.
3. Exemplo de chamada à API privada
curl -s https://api.cortexrouter.ai/v1/audit/completions \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $CORTEXROUTER_API_KEY" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"model":"cortexrouter-zero-1.0-119b","reasoning_effort":"high","case_ref":"ZR-DEMO-04","cwe_focus":"CWE-639"}'
#05 CWE-362 · Go · Ledger Service Read-Then-Write Balance Check Outside Serializable Transaction Enables Double-Spend CRYPTO / SIG
1. Trecho de código analisado (Exemplo sintético)
// synthetic/ledger/withdraw.go
func Withdraw(ctx context.Context, db *sql.DB, acctID string, amount int64) error {
    var bal int64
    _ = db.QueryRowContext(ctx, "SELECT balance FROM accounts WHERE id=$1", acctID).Scan(&bal)
    if bal < amount {
        return ErrInsufficientFunds
    }
    _, err := db.ExecContext(ctx, "UPDATE accounts SET balance = balance - $1 WHERE id=$2", amount, acctID)
    return err
}
2. Raciocínio estruturado do CortexRouter Zero 1.0 (119B MoE)
01 · ESPECIALISTAS ATIVOS
Concurrency & DB-Isolation Expert + State-Invariant Checker
02 · CLASSE MITRE CWE
CWE-362 (CRYPTO / SIG)
06 · VEREDITO
✓ CONFIRMED_LOGIC_FLAW
03 · POR QUE O SAST FALHA
Sequential logic appears sound in single-threaded control-flow analysis.
04 · CAUSA RAIZ
Concurrent requests pass `bal < amount` simultaneously before `UPDATE` commits, driving account balance negative.
05 · CORREÇÃO MÍNIMA
Use a single atomic statement: `UPDATE accounts SET balance = balance - $1 WHERE id = $2 AND balance >= $1`.
3. Exemplo de chamada à API privada
curl -s https://api.cortexrouter.ai/v1/audit/completions \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $CORTEXROUTER_API_KEY" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"model":"cortexrouter-zero-1.0-119b","reasoning_effort":"high","case_ref":"ZR-DEMO-05","cwe_focus":"CWE-362"}'
#06 CWE-918 · TypeScript · Preview Fetch Pre-Fetch IP Blocklist Bypassed via HTTP 302 Redirect to Cloud Metadata WEB / XSS-CSRF
1. Trecho de código analisado (Exemplo sintético)
// synthetic/preview/fetcher.ts
export async function fetchRemoteAvatar(rawUrl: string): Promise<ArrayBuffer> {
  const parsed = new URL(rawUrl);
  const resolvedIp = await dnsLookup(parsed.hostname);
  if (isPrivateOrLinkLocalIp(resolvedIp)) {
    throw new Error("Blocked internal address");
  }
  // Default redirect: "follow" silently follows 302 -> http://169.254.169.254/!
  const resp = await fetch(parsed.toString(), { signal: AbortSignal.timeout(3000) });
  return resp.arrayBuffer();
}
2. Raciocínio estruturado do CortexRouter Zero 1.0 (119B MoE)
01 · ESPECIALISTAS ATIVOS
Network-Boundary Expert + HTTP-Client Semantics Analyzer
02 · CLASSE MITRE CWE
CWE-918 (WEB / XSS-CSRF)
06 · VEREDITO
✓ CONFIRMED_LOGIC_FLAW
03 · POR QUE O SAST FALHA
`isPrivateOrLinkLocalIp` check is present right before `fetch`, fooling SSRF taint rules.
04 · CAUSA RAIZ
Initial URL resolves to an external attacker IP that responds `302 Found` to `http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/`, which `fetch` follows without re-checking.
05 · CORREÇÃO MÍNIMA
Set `redirect: 'error'` (or validate every hop via a custom socket dialer pinning the verified IP).
3. Exemplo de chamada à API privada
curl -s https://api.cortexrouter.ai/v1/audit/completions \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $CORTEXROUTER_API_KEY" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"model":"cortexrouter-zero-1.0-119b","reasoning_effort":"high","case_ref":"ZR-DEMO-06","cwe_focus":"CWE-918"}'
#07 CWE-22 · Rust · Tar Extractor Two-Entry Symlink + File Tarball Escapes Destination Directory (Symlink Zip-Slip) MEMORY / DOS
1. Trecho de código analisado (Exemplo sintético)
// synthetic/archiver/unpack.rs
pub fn unpack_bundle(archive: &mut Archive<File>, dest: &Path) -> io::Result<()> {
    for entry in archive.entries()? {
        let mut entry = entry?;
        let rel = entry.path()?;
        if rel.components().any(|c| matches!(c, Component::ParentDir)) {
            return Err(io::Error::new(io::ErrorKind::InvalidInput, "parent traversal"));
        }
        // Entry 1 creates symlink 'dest/sub -> /etc'; Entry 2 writes 'dest/sub/cron.d/job'!
        entry.unpack(dest.join(&rel))?;
    }
    Ok(())
}
2. Raciocínio estruturado do CortexRouter Zero 1.0 (119B MoE)
01 · ESPECIALISTAS ATIVOS
Filesystem-State Expert + Multi-Step Archive Simulator
02 · CLASSE MITRE CWE
CWE-22 (MEMORY / DOS)
06 · VEREDITO
✓ CONFIRMED_LOGIC_FLAW
03 · POR QUE O SAST FALHA
`Component::ParentDir` (`..`) check blocks lexical path traversal on individual entry names.
04 · CAUSA RAIZ
Lexical path check ignores previously extracted symlink entries (`sub -> /etc`), allowing subsequent clean relative paths to write outside `dest`.
05 · CORREÇÃO MÍNIMA
Reject symlink/hardlink archive entries (`EntryType::Symlink`) and use `openat2(..., RESOLVE_BENEATH)`.
3. Exemplo de chamada à API privada
curl -s https://api.cortexrouter.ai/v1/audit/completions \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $CORTEXROUTER_API_KEY" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"model":"cortexrouter-zero-1.0-119b","reasoning_effort":"high","case_ref":"ZR-DEMO-07","cwe_focus":"CWE-22"}'
#08 CWE-444 · C · Reverse Proxy Parser Tab-Separated `Transfer-Encoding:\tchunked` Triggers CL.TE Request Smuggling WEB / XSS-CSRF
1. Trecho de código analisado (Exemplo sintético)
// synthetic/edgeproxy/http_hdr.c
int has_chunked_encoding(const char *hdr_line) {
    // Only checks exact ASCII space after colon; misses horizontal tab '\t' or OWS!
    return strncasecmp(hdr_line, "Transfer-Encoding: chunked", 26) == 0;
}
2. Raciocínio estruturado do CortexRouter Zero 1.0 (119B MoE)
01 · ESPECIALISTAS ATIVOS
RFC-9112 Grammar Expert + Differential Parser Fuzzer
02 · CLASSE MITRE CWE
CWE-444 (WEB / XSS-CSRF)
06 · VEREDITO
✓ CONFIRMED_LOGIC_FLAW
03 · POR QUE O SAST FALHA
Code explicitly inspects `Transfer-Encoding` header, appearing to handle chunked framing.
04 · CAUSA RAIZ
Edge proxy ignores `Transfer-Encoding:\tchunked` and forwards using `Content-Length`, while RFC-compliant backend parses chunked body—desynchronizing the socket.
05 · CORREÇÃO MÍNIMA
Parse optional whitespace (OWS: SP / HTAB) per RFC 9112 and reject requests containing both `Transfer-Encoding` and `Content-Length`.
3. Exemplo de chamada à API privada
curl -s https://api.cortexrouter.ai/v1/audit/completions \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $CORTEXROUTER_API_KEY" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"model":"cortexrouter-zero-1.0-119b","reasoning_effort":"high","case_ref":"ZR-DEMO-08","cwe_focus":"CWE-444"}'

Comparação — Zero 1.0 (119B) vs Judge v1 (8B)

Dimensão CortexRouter Zero 1.0 (Principal) CortexRouter Judge v1 (Verificador aberto)
Arquitetura base Mistral Small 4 · 119B MoE híbrido (128 especialistas, ~6,5B ativos) Qwen3-8B + Adaptador PEFT LoRA
Janela de contexto 256.000 tokens (Repositório completo, AST e fluxo entre arquivos) 32.768 tokens (Resposta HTTP e evidência de laboratório)
Função principal Auditoria profunda de código-fonte, descoberta zero-day e sugestão de patch Verificação de evidências e corte de falsos positivos (80/80 Holdout)
Acesso e Licença Pesos não publicados (Gated) · API privada mediante solicitação Pesos abertos Apache-2.0 (Hugging Face e GitHub)

Como solicitar acesso privado à API

Exemplo de requisição e resposta da API privada

Esquema JSON retornado pelo endpoint privado CortexRouter Zero 1.0:

POST /v1/audit/completions (Request)

{
  "model": "cortexrouter-zero-1.0-119b",
  "reasoning_effort": "high",
  "zero_data_retention": true,
  "repository_context": {
    "language": "go",
    "files": ["auth/grant_router.go", "auth/ticket.go"]
  }
}

Structured Audit Diagnostics (Response)

{
  "verdict": "VULNERABLE",
  "cwe": "CWE-287",
  "confidence": 0.98,
  "routed_experts": ["auth-state", "cross-branch-taint"],
  "call_chain": ["IssueToken -> mintTicketToken"],
  "minimal_patch_ready": true
}